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ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR REFORM OF 
U.S. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
 
IRA LEWIS 





ABSTRACT: A considerable amount of New Public Management-oriented research 
investigates alternative institutional arrangements for provision of services to the 
public. Some of this work argues in support of service delivery through an increase in 
outsourcing or by privatization of existing government functions. Air traffic control is 
provided to aircraft operators using airports and airspace all over the world. This 
article studies institutional arrangements of provision of air traffic control employing 
a comparative analysis of six nations: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The objective of the study is to determine 
whether a modification of the governance of the U.S. air traffic control system is 
appropriate and, if so, what alternatives seem most appropriate to replace the current 
system. 
Conclusions based upon the analysis suggest that air traffic control is most 
effectively provided on a not-for-profit basis, with indirect participation by 
stakeholders including airlines and airport operators in the governance of the air 
traffic control provider. For reasons related to safety, national security, and 
international obligations, governments remain ultimately responsible for providing 
this essential service. However, a strong argument may be made that the U.S. system 




Attributes of New Public Management (NPM) reforms include disaggregation and 
decentralization of public services, as well as an emphasis on the adoption of private-
sector management practices within the public sector (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002). 
Accordingly, the NPM literature often addresses establishment of alternative forms of 
service delivery, including outsourcing or privatization of government functions 
(Borins 2002). It has been argued that where changes in institutional arrangements for 
service delivery are designed to give organizations specific mandates to focus on 
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providing greater benefits to specific groups of users, responsiveness and the quality of 
service should improve (Aucoin 1998). In addition, it has been asserted that reductions 
in information costs have led to an increase in the effectiveness of process-oriented 
structures, such as independent organizations with focused service delivery 
responsibilities relative to functional structures with a wide scope of responsibilities, 
e.g., a large government department (Jones and Thompson 1999, 29). 
Advocates of NPM also have leveraged the concept of the minimalist state, where 
government arranges for specific services but does not necessarily provide them (Jones 
and Thompson 1999, 18; Savas 2000, 65; Pollitt 2002). In contrast to traditional public 
administration, NPM also is concerned with implementation rather than solely with 
policy prescriptions (Kelman 2003). The focus is therefore more on the operation of 
management systems and techniques, and associated outcomes. Often these approaches 
cannot be decided upon or implemented unilaterally, but require some type of 
cooperative relationship between stakeholders (Jones 2003, 9-16). 
Among the traditional functions of government, air traffic control (ATC) is 
provided for the purpose of preventing collisions between aircraft in the air and 
between aircraft and obstructions on the ground, as well as expediting and maintaining 
an orderly flow of air traffic. In addition to ATC, the effective management of air 
traffic requires associated services such as meteorology, search and rescue, and 
telecommunications, as well as the provision of aeronautical information such as 
charts. When grouped with ATC, these ancillary functions are termed air navigation 
services (ANS) (International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] 1997, 83). ANS is 
therefore a broader term and describes the range of services provided somewhat more 
accurately than ATC, but the latter label is better known. Therefore, ATC is used in this 
article to describe the services under consideration. An additional factor in this regard 
is that most of the world’s nations place meteorological services and search and rescue 
provision, both of which are included under the definition of ANS, under other 
organizations rather than assigning them to the ATC provider. 
The first section of this article describes the institutional context for ATC. We then 
move to an explanation of our motivation for choosing the delivery arrangements of six 
nations for comparative analysis. This is followed by an analysis of the key features of 
the ATC providers in each country. The next section compares and contrasts nation-
specific characteristics, with a goal of making a preliminary determination of what the 
elements of a successful approach might be for reforming the U.S. ATC system. We 
examine evidence that suggests reform of the U.S. system is needed. Our analysis 
indicates the type of reform the U.S. should adopt and why change should be a high 
policy priority. We explore issues that must be addressed should reform be attempted, 
and suggest topics related to provision of ATC services that require further research. 
 
THE CONTEXT OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL REFORM 
 
The provision by governments of ATC reflects the responsibility of the state for safety, 
international relations, and indirectly, the macroeconomic benefits of ensuring a sound 
infrastructure for aviation. ATC is a public good provided to all aircraft using a 
country’s airfields and airspace (Weimer and Vining 1991; Lieberman and Hall 2000). 
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However, ATC also represents a service that directly benefits only a limited number of 
users, notably aircraft owners and operators.  
The idea that the users of the system, rather than the taxpaying public, should incur 
the costs associated with ATC provision is inherent in the commercialization process 
(Poole and Butler 2002). However, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) sets out broad principles for the establishment of user charges, which member 
states are expected to comply with. The core ICAO policy on user charges states that 
only distance flown and aircraft weights are acceptable parameters for use in a charging 
system (ICAO 1997, 59). These two factors are considered to be easy to measure, bear 
a reasonable relationship to the value of service received, and do not discriminate due 
to factors such as where the flight originated or the nation of aircraft registration. 
From the private-sector perspective, investors find ATC assets of interest because 
“they have a vital role to play in the economy, and there is little or no chance that the 
companies involved could go bankrupt and the equipment left unused” (Asset Finance 
International 2003, 1). Therefore ATC services, within the NPM framework, represent 
a viable candidate for studying alternative means of service delivery. 
The central document governing the global organization of ATC is the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation, commonly referred to as the Chicago Convention, 
whose original version was signed in that city in 1944 (ICAO 2000). In the convention, 
contracting states agreed to ensure the minimum standards of ATC established by 
ICAO, a specialized United Nations agency created by the convention. 
Emanating from obligations under the Chicago Convention, ATC has traditionally 
been provided by line agencies of national governments. However, there is a 
widespread trend toward transferring delivery of ATC services out of line departments 
of national governments to independent agencies or corporations. The Civil Air 
Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO), which is the trade association for 
independent ATC providers, currently counts thirty-one members (CANSO 2003a). 
However, whatever delivery mechanism is chosen, national governments remain 
ultimately responsible for ensuring that adequate ATC services are available (ICAO 
1997, 7). 
ICAO has developed three broad categories to describe the organizational forms of 
ATC providers: government departments, autonomous public-sector organizations, and 
private-sector organizations. In a 1997 document, ICAO noted that there were no 
known examples of private-sector ATC provision (8-9). However, the 2001 partial 
privatization of National Air Traffic Services Ltd. (NATS) in the United Kingdom now 
provides a case of a private-sector, for-profit ATC enterprise (Shaoul 2003). 
Jones (2003, 14) has commented that public management researchers “want to 
know how their findings on cases in one institutional, governance, and socio-economic 
and cultural setting related to findings and dynamics in other systems, nations, levels of 
government, etc.” Similarly, as explained by Borins (1998) in an early yet prescient 
comparative review of NPM in commonwealth nations, what works in one public-
sector context may not work in another political, economic, or social setting. 
While there are comparative studies of airline and airport privatization (Advani and 
Borins 2001; Backx, Carney, and Gedajlovic 2002; Doganis 2002; Staniland 2003), we 
were unable to locate a comparative analysis of ATC reform. The literature on changes 
to the governance of ATC (Goodliffe 2002; Lovink 1999; Shaoul 2003) has focused 
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mostly on the experience of individual nations in transforming their ATC services. 
Charles and Newman (1995) briefly discussed the experience of New Zealand in their 
review of the proposals for ATC reform in the U.S.  Golaszewski (2002) provided a 
brief review of the differences between ATC provision in the U.S. and Europe, but 
focused on air traffic management issues (such as congestion and delay) rather than 
governance or organizational form. 
While the U.S. has yet to undertake any significant change in how ATC is 
delivered, the experience of other nations is relevant to the design of any eventual U.S. 
reforms. We have, therefore, chosen five additional countries with a view towards 
examining their experiences with the reform of ATC provision. Our choice of nations 
was motivated as follows. First, we selected Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom, which Barzelay considers “benchmark cases of NPM,” a view supported by 
Aucoin in his study of reforms in Canada (Barzelay 2001, 55; Aucoin 1995). 
Additionally, all three of those countries have moved ATC delivery out of the line 
department structure into independent organizations. 
We then added Canada, also a member of the commonwealth, and the U.S.’ largest 
trading partner, which shares a 7,065-mile border with the U.S. (Cody 2003). Airline 
traffic between the U.S. and Canada also represents the largest international air traffic 
market in the world, and Canadian ATC directs a great deal of traffic between the U.S. 
and third nations (Pustay 1999). We also added Switzerland to our selection, in order to 
include a nation outside the Anglo-American sphere. Switzerland is of particular 
interest as the first country to establish an independent not-for-profit corporation for 
ATC provision, Radio-Suisse (now called Skyguide), doing so in 1921 (CANSO 
2002b). Finally, we will examine the current arrangements for ATC in the U.S. in order 
to contrast them with the five other nations studied. In doing so, we were inspired by 
the variation-finding approach to comparative case analysis undertaken in Barzelay’s 
examination of NPM in the U.S. and five other countries (Barzelay 2001, 55). 
It should be pointed out that while one cannot deny ATC services to an aircraft 
operator, the regulation of aviation, through aircraft and airline registration and pilot 
licensing, means that nonrecovery of fees is not a significant issue for most ATC 
providers. However, there are significant costs associated with providing ATC services. 
Consistent with the trend toward user fees and cost recovery in many nations, there has 
been a gradual shift toward recovering a greater part of the costs of ATC provision 
from users, rather than taxpayers. 
A focus on self-financing, whether from user charges or by obtaining debt on the 
commercial market, also has the benefit of disciplining ATC providers to control costs. 
However, the post-2001 decline in air trafficʊand ATC providers’ revenueʊhas 
caused major difficulties for ATC providers, whose flexibility in controlling 
expenditures is limited by national and international safety obligations, and the fact that 
typically 70 to 80 percent of their expenditures are on personnel and essential 
recapitalization (Hayes 2003). The current state of affairs has been summarized in the 
following discussions: 
For some months now air navigation service providers . . . and airlines have been on a 
collision course. Recent airline complaints about increases in air traffic control charges 
have hit a sensitive nerve among members of the Civil Air Navigation Services 
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Organisation (CANSO) which held its annual general meeting in early June. After all, 
one of the main raisons d'etre of corporatisation is to position service providers so they 
react flexibly to the needs of their customers. But instead of developing amicable 
partnerships with airlines around the world, corporatised service providers are now 
having to search for ways to bridge the growing divide between the two sides. “How 
does the market see us? Not capable enough of reacting to the current challengesʊtoo 
slow, too inflexible,” according to CANSO chairman and DFS [Deutsche 
Flugsicherung, the German ATC provider] CEO Dieter Kaden. “You are somewhat 
fortunate in that the basis of your operations comprise full cost recovery and no 
economic risk. In contrast, we have to take the full economic risk,” says Dr 
Christopher Klingenberg of Lufthansa. “This has an impact on unit costs. The lower 
the traffic growth, the higher the growth in charges” (Ibid.). 
Reform of ATC highlights two key relationships with central government functions 
held by all ATC providers. First, in traditional ATC provision, as in the case of the 
Federal Aviation Administration in the U.S., the agency that delivers ATC services also 
is responsible for regulating the safety of ATC operators. However, when ATC 
delivery is moved outside of core government functions, regulatory responsibilities for 
safety must be retained in-house. For example, when the United Kingdom spun off 
ATC provision to NATS, the responsibility for regulating that agency’s safety was 
assigned to the Civil Aviation Authority, which formerly had also provided ATC 
services. Given that ATC delivery is increasingly seen as an economic activity that a 
provider supplies for its own benefit, even on a not-for-profit basis, the sponsoring state 
must create a suitable regulatory regime to ensure compliance with safety requirements 
(CANSO 2003c). 
Similar issues arise in terms of economic regulation. With ATC provision moved 
outside of the central machinery of government, the service provider sets rates 
independently, although there are generally governance or advisory mechanisms in 
place to ensure consultation with users. However, the state usually retains some degree 
of economic regulation, notably through the right to review user charges set by the 
board of the ATC provider. These powers must be used with restraint, given that the 
service provider bears the risk and liability for poor performance should revenues prove 
insufficient (CANSO 2003c). 
For example, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, worldwide air traffic 
dropped significantly, forcing many ATC providers, including Nav Canada, to increase 
charges to be able to recover costs and maintain their capital investment plans. Under 
the Civil Air Navigation Services Commercialization Act, the Canadian Transportation 
Agency (CTA), a government regulatory body, was given the authority to review user 
charges set by Nav Canada when an appellant believed the charges were inconsistent 
with the charging principles set out in the act. Air Canada, in challenging rate increases 
set by Nav Canada effective 1 August 2003, alleged that the increased charges were 
inconsistent with the legislated charging principles, as they would generate revenues 
beyond the current and future needs of Nav Canada, and would threaten the financial 
health of the airline. The CTA disagreed, and let the increased charges set by Nav 
Canada stand (Canadian Transportation Agency 2003). 
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In a contrasting case, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
blocked price increases proposed by Airservices Australia because they reflected only a 
short-term decline in air traffic and did not sufficiently consider longer-term prospects 
for recovery of the aviation industry. Additionally, the commission believed that the 
proposed rate increases would discourage Airservices Australia from innovating in 
order to minimize costs (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2003). 
Perhaps in anticipation of the vicious cycle caused by the attempt to maintain revenue 
levels when air traffic declines, the United Kingdom, in its privatization of NATS, 
limited annual rate increases to the retail price index minus a correction factor, which is 
a common regulatory device within European Union countries. However, this 
restriction proved problematic in the post-2001 environment, as we will discuss later in 
this article (UK National Audit Office 2002). 
The second key relationship is that between ATC providers and the military. In 
each of the nations studied, some of the airspace is reserved by the military for 
operations and training. How the relationship between civilian and military ATC is 
managed, including who is responsible for what specific functions, varies by country. 
In addition to routine ATC, other activities, such as search and rescue, responding to 
terrorist threats, and the provision of flight information, also require cooperation 
between the ATC provider and the military. 
Under the traditional assignment of civil ATC to a government department, 
relationships with the military could often be handled informally or through internal 
government arrangements. Reform of ATC, as inspired by NPM, leads to clearer 
accountability for performance and increased autonomy from government. These 
changes have usually resulted in the need to more formally define the respective 
responsibilities, both operational and financial, of the ATC provider and the military. 
As we will discuss below, ATC reform has often led the military to integrate its own 
ATC functions with those of the ATC provider. 
Rather than arguing simply for privatization of ATC, we believe that the transition 
in how ATC services are being delivered has created an opportunity for dialogue. 
Goodliffe (2002) has emphasized that because of the differences between ATC and 
other types of public services, standard models of privatization do not necessarily 
apply, or at least require significant adaptation. The first group of differences includes 
the international obligations of the state to provide ATC and the corresponding 
authority of the state to collect charges. The second group of differences arises from the 
national security aspects of ATC, which include a need for close relationships with the 
military on an ongoing basis. 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL IN SIX NATIONS 
 
Table 1 presents an overview of the key characteristics of ATC providers in the six 
nations reviewed. We first describe the type of organization, its relative size measured 
by total operating expenses, as well as the legislation that established and governs the 
provider. We then summarize the funding strategy as well as relationships with the 
national government in the areas of safety and economic regulation. 
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ATC services in Australia are provided by Airservices Australia, a government-
owned authority created by the Air Services Act 1995. The same legislation also 
created the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to separate the safety regulation function 
from the ATC provider. Airservices also is unique among the ATC providers reviewed 
in this article in that the organization also is responsible for airport firefighting services. 
Since 1995, there has been some discussion of transforming Airservices into a 
corporation and opening up some ATC functions to competition, but no such changes 
have been introduced so far (CANSO 1999, 34-40; Airservices Australia 2001; 
Airservices Australia 2003). The minister for transport and regional services appoints 
all members of the Airservices board of directors. There are currently six independent 
directors plus the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer. 
The relationship between Airservices and the Department of Defence is managed 
through a series of agreements (CANSO 1999, 35). The two organizations are working 
on integrating the management of Australia’s airspace, as well as developing a model 
for cost recovery by Airservices of services provided to the Department of Defence, 




The Canadian reform of ATC was significantly influenced by reforms in Australia 
and New Zealand. However, when Nav Canada was created in 1996 through the Civil 
Air Navigation Services Commercialization Act, Parliament did not follow the example 
of those two countries in creating an independent government agency. Rather, the 
legislation provided for a private sector, not-for-profit, non-share capital corporation, 
with a board of directors composed of stakeholder representatives. The result has been 
described as the world’s first fully privatized air traffic control system (Baglole 2001), 
and the stakeholder board is viewed as the most distinctive element of Nav Canada’s 
governance structure (Poole and Butler 2002). 
There are fifteen members on Nav Canada’s board of directors; the Air Transport 
Association of Canada, which represents the nation’s air carriers, appoints four. The 
Canadian Business Aircraft Association, representing corporate aviation users, names 
one board member; Nav Canada unions appoint two; and three members are appointed 
by the government. In turn, these ten individuals select an additional four independent 
directors. Together, the fourteen directors then name the president/chief executive 
officer. 
The relationship between Nav Canada and the Department of National Defence is 
governed by a series of agreements. As in Australia, neither of the organizations charge 
the other for services provided in their respective airspace (CANSO 1999, 75). While 
the military operates its own ATC services, it is of interest that the Nav Canada 
Training Institute does all formal training of military ATC controllers. This 
arrangement precedes the creation of Nav Canada; previously, the Department of 
Transport trained all civilian and military controllers. Nav Canada has also provided 
contract training to controllers from twenty-five nations (Nav Canada 2004). 
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Nav Canada’s autonomous structure has been suggested by one U.S. research 
organization as the model for eventual FAA reform (Poole and Butler 2001). A further 
point is that the government does not guarantee the company’s debt, and any financing 
is obtained on the commercial market (CANSO 1999, 77). Initial funding to buy the 
ATC system from the government came from long-term bank loans and bond issues, 
with any surplus revenue reinvested in the company. Under government ownership, the 
Canadian ATC system had problems with obsolete equipment and undercapitalization 
similar to those of the FAA. In contrast, Canada now has what has been called the 
world’s most modern air navigation system (Baglole 2001). 
Given Canada’s distinctive strategy of placing the ATC provider outside the 
government, the question arises of how the public interest is to be ensured, particularly 
given that ATC is a monopsony. Lovink (1999) has explained that the enabling 
legislation incorporated the view that the public interest could be satisified by 
 
x requiring the company, as a nonprofit enterprise, to reinvest any surplus back into 
the business; 
x as mentioned above, setting up a board composed of stakeholders in the aviation 
system; 
x setting out principles for how user charges were to be developed, including a 
requirement to respect international obligations; and, 
x allowing appeals by aircraft operators to the Canadian Transportation Agency, a 
government regulator, where it was believed that the above principles were not 
being respected. 
 
Nav Canada encountered considerable success in its first few years. In the period from 
1996 to 1999, productivity (measured in flights per employee) increased 32 percent, 
airline costs decreased 33 percent, controller salaries went up 33 percent, and the total 
number of employees declined 14 percent, although none of the positions eliminated 
were controllers or technicians (Wald 1999). 
The reforms have not been without criticism, particularly in the post-2001 period. 
Unions have complained about being denied the right to refuse overtime, despite 
significant pay raises since privatization. One labor representative called Nav Canada a 
financial disaster, with $176 million (Canadian) in debt and its largest customer, Air 
Canada, in bankruptcy proceedings. Even Nav Canada’s president has termed the post-
2001 downturn in air traffic a catastrophe (Carr 2003). As mentioned earlier, during 
2003 Air Canada, which represents 28 percent of Nav Canada’s revenue, 
unsuccessfully appealed an increase in user charges to the Canadian Transportation 
Agency. This was the first appeal to the agency since the creation of Nav Canada in 
1996 (Airports 2003; Poole and Butler 2002). At the time Nav Canada announced the 
increased charges, an article entitled “Nav Can Ups Carrier Fees 7 Percent: Airlines 
Condemn Increases as Latest Shock to Sector,” by I. Jack in the National Post 
(Toronto) on 22 July 2003, described the company’s challenge as follows: 
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Nav Canada, the operator of the country's air traffic control system, is raising the fees 
it charges the financially ravaged airline industry by 7 percent as it combats a deficit of 
its own. The airlines condemned the move and said they will probably have to absorb 
the cost rather than pass it on to customers, a further blow in tough times for a 
beleaguered industry. “Nav Canada's rate increase is completely out of touch with 
reality. Canada's air industry is facing some of the worst economic circumstances that 
it has seen in its history,” said Laura Cooke, Air Canada's spokeswoman. 
“It’s a blow any time costs rise, and it's the airlines that have to come up with the 
money in this environment,” said Warren Everson, vice-president of the Air Transport 
Association of Canada. WestJet Airlines Ltd. complained part of Nav Canada's deficit 
comes from money that Air Canada has not paid. “It’s disappointing that the industry 
is having to pay for that [Air Canada deficit] and, more importantly, that the customers 
are having to pay for it,” said Siobhan Vinish, spokeswoman for Calgary-based 
WestJet. Nav Canada, a non-profit company, took a $22 million charge in the quarter 
for fees not paid by Air Canada. The carrier, which is in bankruptcy protection, owes 
Nav Canada $45 million. 
 
In its appeal, Air Canada had alleged that the financial health of the airline industry was 
material to Nav Canada in setting user charges (Canadian Transportation Agency 
2003). Also, general aviation (corporate and recreational aircraft) users claim they are 
being asked to pay a disproportionate share of costs compared to airlines (Baglole 
2001; Lovink 1999). Despite the downturn in user charges, Nav Canada has maintained 
a high AA credit rating with Standard & Poor’s. While Air Canada has been reducing 
its fleet size, competing airlines were viewed by S&P as likely to at least partially 
replace any cuts in Air Canada service. Also, a restructured Air Canada could emerge 
from the current bankruptcy proceedings with a stronger and more stable traffic base. 
S&P did acknowledge that Nav Canada’s ability to raise rates beyond the 6.9 percent 




For many students of NPM, New Zealand represents the first nation with the 
Westminster system of government to undertake fundamental reforms in the structure 
of government and in the policymaking process. These changes can be traced back to 
the 1983 victory of the Labour Party. At the time, New Zealand was facing a severe 
fiscal crisis, and as explained by Barzelay (2001, 73), the situation “provided an ideal 
context for economic policy to spill over into public management.” Reform in New 
Zealand has been facilitated by the country’s small population of only four million, 
unitary form of government, and single-chamber legislature (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 1999). 
Immediately before being restructured in 1987, ATC provision cost the government 
more than NZ$10 million a year. The Airways Corporation of New Zealand, now a 
state-owned enterprise, claims “air navigation services return to the Government 
shareholder more than $10 million in dividends and taxes every year” (Airways 
Corporation of New Zealand 2003a). Airways also provides all military ATC services 
through a contract with the Ministry of Defence (CANSO 1999, 41). 
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Airways has been described as the most autonomous of the reformed ATC 
organizations that remain part of their national government. This is consistent with the 
principles underlying reform of the public sector in New Zealand, which include the 
provision that commercial functions remaining the responsibility of the state should 
operate as in the private sector as corporations, with independent boards of directors, 
and paying taxes and dividends (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 1999). 
Airways’ board, while named by the two responsible cabinet ministers, is expected 
to set policies in accordance with the government’s role as a rational shareholder 
(Poole and Butler 2001). The firm’s capital structure is based on a debt/equity ratio of 
approximately 50/50; the government does not guarantee Airways’ debt (CANSO 
1999, 41). 
While Airways is not required to consult with users in setting charges, it has chosen 
to do so through a memorandum of understanding with its major airline customers. The 
company has also chosen to self-regulate its returns based on economic value added 
(EVA); excess revenues beyond EVA are used to reduce user charges in subsequent 
years.1 Although there is no formal regulatory process for rate setting, charges can be 
appealed to the New Zealand Commerce Commission (Poole and Butler 2002). The 
International Air Transport Association, the trade group for the world’s major airlines, 
has praised Airways for containing costs, minimizing its increases in user charges 
despite the post-2001 downturn in air traffic (International Air Transport Association 
2003). 
One note of discord concerned Airways’ participation in a consortium that 
unsuccessfully bid on the United Kingdom’s 2001 privatization of NATS, which is 
discussed below in our summary of the UK ATC reforms. There were allegations that 
members of the Airways board who were involved in the preparation of the consortium 
bid for NATS would stand to gain positions in NATS if the UK government accepted 
the bid. An investigation by the New Zealand Controller and Auditor General found 
that while three Airways board members were in a potential conflict of interest 
situation, proper reports were filed with the board, and appropriate controls were in 




Of the six nations reviewed, Switzerland’s ATC arrangements are indeed unique. 
Since the inception of air navigation services in 1921, an independent federal 
corporation has provided ATC services. The firm was originally known as Radio-
Suisse, but changed its name to Swisscontrol in 1987, then to Skyguide in 2001. The 
company’s shares are held almost entirely by the government, with a very small portion 
(0.15 percent) held by the aviation industry (airports, aircraft operators, aviation-related 
organizations, and labor groups). 
Skyguide has a seven-member board, consisting of an independent chairman who is 
currently a private attorney, a vice chairman who represents the military (currently the 
deputy commander-in-chief of the Swiss air force), and five other directors. These are 
currently the deputy director of the Federal Office of Finance, a union representative, 
an independent professional engineer, and the heads of Aerosuisse (the aviation 
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industry trade association) and Swissport Switzerland (the private franchise that 
operates Switzerland’s three major airports at Zurich, Geneva, and Basel) (Skyguide 
2004). 
The government does not fund Skyguide, and debt financing must be obtained 
entirely on the private market; the government does not back Skyguide debt. Like Nav 
Canada, Skyguide can be viewed as a user cooperative, where it is presumed that the 
shared interests of the stakeholders will prevent monopsonistic behavior toward users. 
However, unlike Nav Canada, Skyguide is effectively controlled by the Swiss 
government (Poole and Butler 2002). 
Similar to the arrangement in New Zealand, in 2001 the Swiss military delegated all 
responsibility for ATC in military airspace to Skyguide, and as of 2003 all military 
controllers were integrated into the company’s operations. Skyguide claims that the 
Swiss model represents a greater degree of integration of civil and military ATC than 
that of any other nation (CANSO 2002b; Skyguide 2003). 
In addition to being governed by ICAO regulations and safety and economic 
regulation by the Swiss government, Skyguide, like the United Kingdom’s NATS, 
must comply with economic and safety rules set by the European Organisation for the 
Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), a 41-member organization established in 
1960. EUROCONTROL’s main objectives include the integrated management of 
European air space and the harmonization of national ATC practices. 
EUROCONTROL is independent of, but supported by, the European Union (ICAO 
1997, 94; EUROCONTROL 2003). A key initiative of the organization is the creation 
of the “single European sky,” with upper-level airspace management being provided on 
a regional, rather than a national, basis. 
A mid-air collision on 1 July 2002 was a defining moment for Skyguide. On that 
day, a DHL Boeing 757 freighter hit a Tupolev 154 flown by Russia’s Bashkirian 
Airlines over southern Germany, in Skyguide-controlled airspace. The causes of the 
collision were found to be conflicting directions issued to the two pilots by controllers 
and by both aircrafts’ onboard traffic collision avoidance systems (TCAS). Also, 
understaffing by Skyguide, which had only a single controller on duty to cover the area 
at the time, was determined to be a contributing factor, in addition to communication 
difficulties between Skyguide and the German ATC provider (Thomas 2002; Bowcott 
2002). 
The collision raised systemic issues about the relationship between the various 
national ATC providers, EUROCONTROL, and automated instructions generated by 
the TCAS installed onboard aircraft. The British firm Jane’s commented that as a result 
of the collision and the financial collapse of Swissair, “the blow to national self-esteem 
has been considerable, more than the events themselves might seem to justify” (Jane’s 
Sentinel Security Assessment 2003). Since the collision, Skyguide has been under 
intense scrutiny and has undertaken a number of reforms in partnership with 




Of the six nations reviewed in this article, the evolution and current governance of 
ATC in the United Kingdom are the most complex. There are two key reasons. First, 
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the UK government is the only one of those reviewed to have established ATC as a for-
profit activity. Second, the UK is also the sole known example of the creation of a 
share-capital public-private partnership (PPP) for ATC. In the UK, the ATC provider, 
the government, the nation’s largest airport operator (BAA plc), and a consortium of 
seven British airlines jointly own the ATC provider, NATS. The NATS Employee 
Sharetrust Ltd. also owns 5 percent of NATS’ parent company, NATS Holdings Ltd. 
(UK National Audit Office 2004, 6). 
Further adding to the complexity is that NATS is composed of two wholly owned 
subsidiaries: NATS (En Route) plc, or NERP, and NATS Services Ltd. (NSL). NERP 
is a franchise that is licensed and regulated by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
as the sole enroute ATC provider in that country (Savas 2000, 79-80; NATS [En 
Route] Ltd. 2003). In contrast, NSL is an unregulated company that competes for 
contracts to provide ATC in airport towers (which are not within the scope of NERP’s 
mandate), and also engages in training and consulting on a contract basis in both the 
UK and abroad (UK National Audit Office 2002). The separation of ATC providers 
between those managing airport towers and those responsible for enroute traffic control 
facilities is another unique characteristic of the British system. All the other countries 
reviewed have a single provider for both tower and enroute ATC, with the exception of 
the limited FAA contract tower program discussed in the U.S. section below. 
NATS was originally established in 1962 as an independent government agency 
responsible for both civil and military ATC. In 1972, the agency became part of the 
CAA, but was also made responsible to both the chairman of the CAA and the chief of 
the air staff within the Ministry of Defence (MOD). In 1996, NATS was incorporated 
under the Companies Act, with 100 percent ownership by the CAA, in preparation for 
privatization. At the same time, responsibility for military ATC was transferred back to 
the MOD. Also, safety regulation of ATC was specifically assigned to the Directorate 
of Airspace Policy within the downsized CAA (Goodliffe 2002). 
The license issued by the CAA to NATS (En Route) plc also requires the company 
to cooperate with the MOD. To support coordination, the Joint Air Navigation Services 
Council, created in 1996, was continued under the Transport Act, 2000 to integrate the 
efforts of NATS and MOD; the CAA is also represented on the council (UK House of 
Commons Library 1999). Additionally, MOD has chosen to integrate much of its ATC 
infrastructure with that of NATS. For example, military controllers now operate 
alongside their civilian colleagues at NATS’ new Swanwick Centre, which oversees the 
airspace in England and Wales (CANSO 2002a; UK Ministry of Defence 2002; UK 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 1999). 
The partial privatization of NATS, which was authorized by the Transport Act, 
2000, represents a unique exception to the practice of public ownership and not-for-
profit structure of ATC providers in other nations. The approach taken by the UK 
government must, however, be seen in the context of the widespread use of PPPs in the 
UK. These partnerships are closely associated with the private finance initiative (PFI), 
originally launched by the Conservative government in 1992 but continued under the 
current Labour administration. While the Conservative interest in PPPs was strongly 
influenced by ideological considerations, the Labour government has taken a pragmatic 
approach, viewing partnerships as a way of dealing with fiscal constraints. PPPs are, 
therefore, a means of getting private investment to substitute for public funding 
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(Falconer and McLaughlin 2000; Pollitt 2003, 59; Wettenhall 2003). As of 2003, the 
PFI had led to some 450 contracts underway or completed, with a total value of £50 
billion (Broadbent and Laughlin 2003). 
The choice of a PPP as a way of managing ATC followed an extensive review and 
consultation process with all stakeholders, including the Ministry of Defence (CANSO 
2002a; UK Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 1999). Other 
PPPs in the UK transportation sector include the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, the 
London Underground, and design, build, finance, and operate (DBFO) contracts for 
several motorways (Shaoul 2003). 
The report resulting from the consultation process mentioned above did 
acknowledge that, while a PPP was the preferred option of the government, no 
government had yet privatized its ATC provider. A key issue raised included the 
motivation of profit maximization and cost minimization that would drive a for-profit 
ATC provider. The government also acknowledged that a PPP was not required to raise 
capital, as demonstrated by the restructuring of ATC in Canada and New Zealand. 
Finally, operating ATC with a profit motive would give the CAA an even more 
important role as safety regulator, similar to that which the CAA played over the 
commercial airline industry. Overall, the consultation process did not result in a 
consensus in favor of a PPP; there was more support for the Canada/New Zealand 
model of an independent, nonprofit entity (UK Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions 1999). 
As established by the Transport Act, 2000, NATS had the following structure. Like 
other reformed ATC providers, the firm was designed to be owned by stakeholders. 
The government retained a 49 percent share of the company, although it was deemed to 
be a golden share constituting majority control. NATS employees were assigned 5 
percent of the firm through a trust. The government then requested bids from the 
private sector for the remaining 46 percent. As mentioned above, the government 
selected the Airline Group, a consortium of seven British carriers (British Airways, bmi 
British Midland, Virgin Atlantic, Britannia, Monarch, easyJet, and Airtours), as the 
successful bidders during 2001. The Airline Group consortium also received merger 
clearance from the European Commission (CANSO 2002a). 
Given that NATS was organized as a for-profit corporation, economic regulation 
was deemed necessary. Furthermore, NATS En Route Ltd. (now NATS (En Route) 
plc) was, as the sole UK holder of an enroute ATC license from the CAA, a monopoly. 
The degree of economic regulation, therefore, exceeded that imposed by the other 
nations reviewed on their ATC providers which operate not-for-profit systems. The act 
mandated the CAA to administer a price cap based on the retail price index minus an 
adjustment factor, a regime known as RPI – x. Any increase in user charges beyond the 
price cap required approval from the CAA through a lengthy regulatory process.  
However, like any other ATC provider, NATS is vulnerable to declines in revenue 
should air traffic drop, as it did after the attacks of September 11, 2001. NATS is 
heavily dependent on enroute charges, which account for 75 percent of the firm’s 
revenues. Contract ATC services provided at the towers of fourteen UK airports 
represented only 13 percent of earnings, while services performed for the Ministry of 
Defence and international organizations accounts for the remaining 12 percent (Shaoul 
2003; CANSO 2002a). The post-2001 drop in revenues from enroute charges sent 
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NATS into a tailspin, particularly since it could do little to reduce the cost of its 
unionized workforce and was in the midst of construction of a number of new enroute 
centers that would eventually manage all UK airspace. 
NATS had estimated a need for £100 million of capital investment over the period 
1997–2007. The cost of paying the government for the proceeds of the sale of NATS 
led to the firm’s debt rise to £733 million by 2002. The CAA would not authorize 
increased charges sufficient to offset the decline in traffic, and neither of the firm’s 
shareholders (the UK government and the Airline Group) was in a position to make 
new equity capital available. Ironically, the Airline Group’s member firms were in 
financial turmoil due to the same decline in air traffic that was causing difficulties for 
NATS. Debt servicing had also become challenging for NATS, and the government did 
not wish to take back the firm, which would have led to the PPP being branded a failure 
(UK National Audit Office 2002; Humphreys, Francis, and Ison 2003; Majumdar and 
Ochieng 2003). 
In these circumstances, and with a unilateral injection from the government ruled 
out for fiscal and policy reasons (such action would undermine the very concept of a 
PPP), the only solution was to find equity funding from a new source. The government 
did provide some short-term financing to NATS while looking for a new investor 
during 2002. Finally, in March 2003 a restructuring was announced. NATS, the 
government, the Airline Group, and the CAA had undertaken a major refinancing 
exercise that examined a wide range of options, including creating a not-for-profit 
organization on the Nav Canada model. The approach chosen, dubbed the composite 
solution by NATS, preserved key features of the PPP while attracting a new investment 
of £5 million in share capital and £60 million in loans from BAA plc (UK National 
Audit Office 2004, 1-4). 
BAA owns and operates seven airports in the UK: London’s Heathrow, Gatwick, 
and Stansted Airports, and the airports serving Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and 
Southampton. The firm, which evolved from the 1987 privatization of the British 
Airports Authority, had 2003 revenues of £1,933 million. BAA is therefore heavily 
involved in the aviation industry, and is one of NATS’ clients, hiring NATS Services 
Ltd. to perform tower ATC at its UK airports. BAA also holds partial ownership or 
management contracts in a number of overseas airports, including Indianapolis, Boston, 
and Pittsburgh (BAA plc 2004). The government matched BAA’s investment, also 
contributing £5 million in share capital and £60 million in loans (Dunn 2003; 
Woodman 2003). 
With the new capital infusion, the distribution of the parent firm (NATS Holdings 
Ltd.) shares was modified as follows. BAA now has 4.19 percent, the UK 
government’s ownership dropped from 49 percent to 48.87 percent, the Airline Group’s 
shares went from 46 percent to 41.94 percent, and the NATS Employees Sharetrust 
remains at 5 percent of shares. The National Audit Office (NAO), having examined the 
new capital structure, believed that NATS is now in a more robust financial condition, 
and that adequate conflict of interest measures continue to be in place to protect the 
interests of all parties. The NAO also noted that the new financial structure “has been 
tested by modelling a wider range of exacting scenarios than those used when setting 
up the PPP,” and that the restructured NATS should be able to withstand almost any 
foreseeable downturn in air traffic (UK National Audit Office 2004, 1-4). Finally, the 
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CAA agreed to a more flexible approach to regulating NATS user charges, while 
introducing higher penalties for flight delays caused by factors under NATS control. 
Also, any financial risk due to a decline in air traffic is now divided equally between 
NATS and its customers (Dunn 2003; Euroweek 2003). 
The composition of the board of the parent company, NATS Holdings Ltd., was 
modified slightly by the addition of two directors from BAA plc. The other members 
now include three directors named by the government and ten who represent the 
Airline Group, with that owner allowed to appoint an additional two directors’ 
positions currently vacant. The NATS Employee Sharetrust, which owns 5 percent of 
NATS, is not entitled to appoint directors (UK National Audit Office 2004, 6). 
In summary, the evolution of NATS represents a lesson learned in terms of the 
conceptualization and design of PPPs. Despite the guaranteed need for ATC services, 
privatization did lead to considerable financial risk. This risk, which the government 
originally desired to transfer to the private owners of NATS through the PPP, ended up 
being borne by the government itself. The entry of BAA plc as a white knight has at 
least temporarily eliminated the possibility of bankruptcy or a government takeover, 
and the politically important principle of preserving NATS as a PPP has been 
respected. But there is also a clear message in the NATS experience for those nations 
wishing to privatize their ATC services (Humphreys, Francis, and Ison 2003; Linder 




In contrast to the other nations analyzed, the U.S. stands out for continuing to both 
regulate and deliver ATC services through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
a bureau of the U.S. Department of Transportation. The FAA is the direct descendant 
of the Aeronautics Branch of the U.S. Department of Commerce, created in 1926 (U.S. 
Federal Aviation Administration 2004a). However, the FAA does benefit from a 
somewhat greater degree of flexibility in personnel management and procurement than 
other U.S. government agencies (U.S. General Accounting Office 2003a). Also, private 
firms operate a small number of towers (currently 69) at low-volume airfields. 
Adversaries of the contract towers program view it as a harbinger of widespread 
privatization of the FAA (Hughes 2003; Keane 2003; Poole and Butler 2001, 14). 
The FAA’s challenges in modernizing its infrastructure have been a key driver of 
proposals for reform. Antiquated and unreliable equipment, an aging workforce, and 
resistance to change have been cited as the key barriers to effective FAA performance 
of the ATC function (U.S. General Accounting Office 1995). Additionally, the FAA 
has a poor track record in managing large capital projects (U.S. General Accounting 
Office 2003a; Mead 2003). Prior to the creation of Nav Canada, the same situation 
prevailed with the management of large-scale ATC projects by Canada’s Department 
of Transport. Indeed, improved management of technology has been cited as one of the 
key accomplishments of Nav Canada since its creation in 1996 (CANSO 1999, 72). 
Restructuring of ATC in the United States was first proposed in 1993 as part of the 
National Performance Review (Poole and Butler 2001, 6). Reform has not been 
possible, despite unsuccessful attempts in 1995 and 1998 by the Clinton administration 
to promote legislation creating a government corporation somewhat like those in 
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Australia and New Zealand, an option known as corporatization (United States General 
Accounting Office 1995; Treanor 1998). Since then, there has been little discussion of 
restructuring of ATC services in the U.S. along the lines of the other nations reviewed 
in this article, with the exception of a study funded by the conservative Reason Public 
Policy Institute. The study suggested creating a stakeholder-controlled corporation 
based on the Nav Canada model (Poole and Butler 2001). U.S. attempts at reform have 
been described as follows in a 23 October 1999 article by M.L. Wald in the New York 
Times entitled “Sale of Air Traffic System Has Led to Technical Advances”: “The 
Clinton Administration has repeatedly tried to tinker with the structure of the F.A.A., 
and three years ago freed the agency from many Federal constraints on personnel and 
procurement policy. Last year, the Administration proposed making the F.A.A. a 
‘performance-based organization’ like the Patent and Trademark Office, which sets its 
own fees and controls its revenues, but Congress did not agree. Members of Congress 
enjoy their leverage over the F.A.A., bringing home bacon to their constituents in the 
form of instrument landing systems, new runways and the like.” 
However, during 2003, the FAA did announce an internal reorganization that 
groups the major functions that support ATC (such as procurement and financial 
management) under an air traffic organization, rather than having them scattered 
throughout the FAA. This reorganization is consistent with the 1997 recommendations 
of the National Civil Aviation Review Commission, which proposed a performance-
based organization within the FAA to manage ATC. However, the reorganization 
announced in 2003 does not incorporate one of the key recommendations of the 
Commission report, the creation of a board to manage the new organization. The 
concept of a stakeholder board was also the key Nav Canada innovation that the 
Reason Public Policy Institute recommended for the U.S. (Poole and Butler 2001). The 
reorganization announced by the FAA in 2003 is also intended to foster a greater sense 
of accountability for performance and productivity in the delivery of air traffic services 
(Bond 2003; National Civil Aviation Review Commission 1997; U.S. Federal Aviation 
Administration 2003a, 2003b). Given the size and complexity of ATC operations in the 
U.S., the close relationship of ATC to other national security functions, and opposition 
from unions and members of Congress, significant changes to the governance of ATC 
functions are unlikely. 
The relationship between the FAA and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is 
extremely complex, and beyond the scope of this article. Part of the challenge in 
documenting this relationship is the FAA’s current organizational structure as 
described above, which does not separate ATC from other FAA functions such as 
aircraft registration, pilot licensing, and safety regulation. Another is the sheer size and 
complexity of DOD, which dwarfs the defense organizations of the other nations 
reviewed in this article (Thompson and Jones 1994; United States General Accounting 
Office 2003b). In brief, the FAA is responsible for managing an integrated system of 
civil and military ATC throughout the U.S., while the military provides ATC to cover 
airfields and airspace directly under military jurisdiction. DOD provides about 20 
percent of air traffic services in the U.S. (MITRE 2000). 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 provoked a major reexamination of FAA’s 
relationship with DOD. The FAA is currently developing a national plan for the 
nation’s airspace through 2025, in cooperation with DOD, the Department of 
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Homeland Security, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the 
Department of Commerce (U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 2004b). The creation 
of U.S. Northern Command as a coordinating body for the military’s support to 
homeland security has also provided a central DOD point of contact for liaison with 
other federal agencies, including the FAA (Reuters 2003; United States Northern 
Command 2004; McHale 2003). 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE  
DELIVERY OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
 
The reforms to ATC in the six nations reviewed above have led to a diversity of 
approaches toward service delivery. Within that context, institutional arrangements can 
be viewed as existing along three different axes, as illustrated in figure 1. We show 
traditional government operation of ATC on the far right, with the U.S. as an example. 
The opposite end of the spectrum is the UK, the only known country to have attempted 
to provide ATC on a for-profit basis. However, it is significant that the UK government 
has retained a controlling interest in the shares of the ATC provider. We will review the 
developments in the five nations that have restructured ATC provision first, and in the 
next section discuss implications for potential U.S. reforms. 
Located in between the U.S. and the UK in figure 1 are four countries that represent 
an interesting diversity of approaches. As emphasized by Jones and Kettl (2003, 9), 
“even relatively similar nations, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand, have produced markedly different strategies” for public management 
reform. Australia has created an independent government agency with its own board, 
although a cabinet minister names its members. New Zealand’s arrangements are 
slightly bolder than those of Australia, with the ATC provider assuming a corporate 
structure. In a similar approach to Australia, a cabinet minister names the board as well. 
However,  both  Airservices  Australia  and the  Airways  Corporation  of New Zealand  
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FIGURE 1. Responsibility for the Delivery of Air Traffic Control Services 
404 International Public Management Journal Vol. 7, No. 3, 2004 
 
have been successful at raising capital on the private market, even though their debt is 
not backed by their respective governments. 
Nav Canada stands out for its unique governance and structure. The corporation has 
no share capital, and its board is made up of stakeholders represented either directly (in 
the case of the government and the Nav Canada unions) or indirectly through 
associations (with respect to the airline industry and general aviation). Unlike its UK 
counterpart, Nav Canada is a not-for-profit firm. Like its counterparts in the UK, 
Australia, and New Zealand, Nav Canada obtains its capital from the open market 
without a government guarantee of debt. Interestingly, the UK’s legislative auditor has 
on two occasions recommended the Nav Canada model as a possible solution for the 
challenges faced by NATS (UK National Audit Office 2002, 2004). The Canadian 
approach has also been suggested as a potential model for U.S. reform of ATC (Poole 
and Butler 2001). 
As students of public management might expect, the Swiss approach to the delivery 
of ATC is unique. Since the inception of ATC in 1921, Switzerland has provided ATC 
through a government-owned corporation. Recent reforms have placed a very small 
percentage of the shares of Skyguide (0.15% of total capital) in the hands of the 
nation’s aviation industry association (Aerosuisse) and the largest airport operator 
(Swissport, a private firm). One senses that the goal of the share issue was to allow for 
participation by the stakeholders without compromising government control of 
Skyguide. Although the company remains entirely outside the line structure of the 
Swiss government, the majority of its board is government appointed. 
The appropriate placement of Switzerland on the axes in figure 1 is somewhat 
problematic. On the surface, Skyguide would seem more like Nav Canada (due to its 
stakeholder board) or the UK National Air Traffic Services, due to private-sector 
ownership of share capital. But one could also argue that with the government having 
almost total ownership of Skyguide’s shares, the company is in effect a government 
corporation more like that of New Zealand. 
Finally, the UK stands out not only for its bold, if somewhat ideological, approach 
to ATC in creating a public-private partnership, inspired by the UK’s well-known 
private finance initiative. No other example exists of ATC being provided on a for-
profit basis. Furthermore, the ownership of 41.94 percent of NATS stock by the Airline 
Group, a consortium of seven UK carriers, is also unique. While Nav Canada has 
airlines represented on its board, their voice is heard collectively, through an officer of 
the Air Transport Association of Canada, and Nav Canada, unlike NATS, has no share 
capital. In Switzerland, Aerosuisse and Swissport jointly hold the tiny amount of share 
capital of Skyguide that is in the private sector, and Aerosuisse is a nonprofit trade 
association similar to the Air Transport Association of Canada. In contrast, the UK 
arrangement provides for substantial participation in NATS’ governance by the Airline 
Group, even if a controlling interest remains with the government. 
From the above analysis, several points emerge. First, even among the four 
Westminster countries, a range of approaches exists in the institutional arrangements 
for ATC. The UK approach is perhaps described as adventurous, with Australia and 
New Zealand following a more conservative but practical approach to reform. Canada 
has been somewhat bolder, but even then, the Nav Canada model recognizes the 
importance of involving stakeholders while keeping them at arm’s length. 
405 International Public Management Journal Vol. 7, No. 3, 2004 
 
Second, whatever the reforms adopted, national governments remain ultimately 
responsible for ensuring that adequate and reasonably priced ATC services are 
provided. This responsibility derives directly from the role of governments in ensuring 
public safety, providing basic transportation infrastructure, and supporting economic 
development. The government’s role in ATC is also directly related to national defense. 
Also, international obligations, whether bilateral or multilateral, require governments to 
provide ATC to aircraft of other nations entering their airspace. 
In each of the five nations that have reformed ATC delivery, institutional changes 
have led to a careful examination of the relationship between the ATC provider and the 
military. As well, reform has resulted in further integration of military and civil ATC 
infrastructure and personnel. These changes have also benefited defense ministries, 
which have been able to reduce their own expenditures by outsourcing certain functions 
to the ATC provider. 
Finally, in light of the UK experience, one might argue that institutional 
arrangements for ATC should have a not-for-profit orientation. While efficiency and 
effectiveness (including safety) are key goals of any ATC provider, there is no 
indication that the pursuit of profit, or direct ownership by private-sector entities, is 
necessary to the success of ATC delivery. Further anchoring this point is that ATC is 
an essential, monopsonistic service that is ultimately the government’s responsibility. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF REFORMS ELSEWHERE FOR ATC IN THE U.S. 
The U.S. model of in-house operation by the FAA, a bureau of the Department of 
Transportation, is also the traditional approach that continues to be followed by most of 
the world’s nations. The U.S. has done the least of the nations reviewed in this article 
to change its institutional arrangements for the delivery of ATC. As we discussed 
above, the inability of the current structure of the FAA to respond to changes in the 
marketplace impedes growth, makes capital investment difficult, and probably has a 
negative impact on safety (U.S. General Accounting Office 2003a; Transportation 
Research Board 1999). While this situation is somewhat ironic, particularly given the 
size and economic impact of aviation in the U.S., the inertia also reflects the adversarial 
nature of U.S. politics and concerns about national security. 
What are some of the potential implications of the reforms abroad on eventual 
changes to delivery of ATC in the U.S.? The question is difficult to answer. In 
conducting this research, we were struck by the relatively cooperative approaches that 
the five non-U.S. governments (in both their executive and legislative branches) and 
industry stakeholders took in developing and implementing new institutional 
arrangements for ATC delivery. This seems to contrast with the U.S. debate on 
potential reforms to ATC, which is much more partisan, places the various stakeholders 
in opposing camps, and reflects a much less cooperative approach to ensuring the 
delivery of ATC. 
For example, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), a 400,000-
member organization that represents the general aviation (small aircraft) sector in the 
U.S., is staunchly opposed to any initiative to move ATC outside the federal 
government. A key AOPA concern is that a restructured, independent ATC provider 
will be governed by and designed for the airlines exclusively. For example, user 
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charges for small aircraft could be raised to an amount that makes recreational flying 
unaffordable (AOPA 2003). In this context, it is worthy of note that Nav Canada has 
made a special concession to small aircraft, for example, charging a flat annual fee of 
between 60 and 200 Canadian dollars for single-engine piston aircraft (Poole and 
Butler 2002). 
In contrast, our research could find no policy statements on the subject of FAA 
restructuring by the Air Transport Association, which represents the major U.S. 
airlines. The British firm Jane’s has also noted this absence of advocacy. The silence is 
somewhat ironic, given the importance of ATC to major carriers (Janes’s Airport 
Review 2000). However, the chief executives of American Airlines, Northwest 
Airlines, and Continental Airlines did support the 1995 corporatization proposals made 
by the Clinton administration, suggesting that Nav Canada serve as a model for U.S. 
reforms (Aviation Daily 1997). 
The issue of labor relations and employee morale also is important in considering 
any major changes to U.S. ATC institutional arrangements. The National Air Traffic 
Controllers Association is firmly opposed to any restructuring of U.S. ATC along 
corporate lines, referring to any such shift as privatization (Sclar 2003). Nav Canada 
downsized significantly during its first three years, but facilitated the transfer of 
employees back to the Canadian government, provided early departure incentives, and 
continued collective bargaining rights. Nav Canada employees are now represented on 
the corporation’s board. Finally, the company has also adopted a nonpunitive approach 
to operational errors, which has helped to improve employee morale significantly 
(Poole and Butler 2002). 
In the U.S. context, there also appears to be a preference for defining entities as in 
either the public sector (through inclusion in a line department) or in the private sector 
(through outsourcing) rather than accepting the blurring of boundaries that is associated 
with NPM. These national characteristics would also help to explain the relative rarity 
of public-private partnerships in the U.S., particularly at the federal level (Borins 2002; 
Moulton and Anheier 2000). 
Two aspects of Nav Canada’s governance therefore appear particularly relevant to 
any contemplated restructuring of U.S. ATC. First, Nav Canada is a private firm, 
although incorporated by special legislation and without share capital. Unlike its 
counterparts in Australia and New Zealand, Nav Canada is not a government agency or 
corporation. Also, both Airservices Australia and the Airways Corporation of New 
Zealand have boards that are entirely named by cabinet ministers. Switzerland’s 
Skyguide allocates 0.15 percent of shares, and two of seven directors, to the aviation 
industry. However, with the Swiss government appointing the other five directors and 
owning 99.85 percent of the stock, the private sector role in managing Skyguide is 
really more of a consultative one. The Canadian approach avoids effective government 
control (as in Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland) while also escaping the pitfalls 
of being required to attract equity capital or earn a profit (as in the UK). Finally, Nav 
Canada’s lack of share capital also helps preserve the notion of ATC as a public good. 
Adding to the challenge of moving ATC outside the mainstream machinery of the 
U.S. government is the increasingly critical relationship between the FAA and other 
federal agencies involved in national security. The images of F-15s and F-16s flying 
alongside commercial aircraft in U.S. airspace reinforce the importance of this 
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relationship, and the stakes involved. While other countries with significant concerns 
about terrorism, such as the UK, have not seen national security as a barrier to reform 
of the ATC provider, the point remains a sensitive one in the U.S. in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Any significant restructuring of ATC in the U.S. would raise significant 
implementation challenges. The UK experience has emphasized the need for a viable 
financial model that can withstand downturns in traffic. At the heart of a new 
corporation’s structure would be decisions on the proportions of revenue provided by 
the different stakeholders (airlines, general aviation, airports, the government). In turn, 
each stakeholder group may expect to participate in the governance of the new 
organization. In reviewing the 1995 Clinton administration proposal to create an ATC 
corporation, the General Accounting Office explained the challenge as follows: “A 
corporation—created and charged to operate like a business—may have little incentive 
to provide equipment and services to users of the system whose financial contributions 
to the system are proportionately less than the value they receive. Included among these 
users are general aviation and small airports. An important issue facing the Congress in 
establishing the corporation will be how it accommodates the needs of such users” 
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1995, 2). 
At the same time, any new U.S. ATC corporation would need to be isolated from 
the uncertainties of the government’s annual budget-making process. Such measures 
would allow the new organization to take a long-term approach to investing in capital 
and personnel, goals that the FAA has had difficulty reaching. Another factor will be 
freedom to manage personnel effectively while treating organized labor in an equitable 
manner. Finally, separate new agencies will need to be established for safety and 
economic regulation; the former might reside within the downsized FAA, while the 
latter might be better placed within the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (Poole 
and Butler 2001, 13). 
In the above context, it is difficult to assess the implications of reforms abroad for 
ATC delivery in the U.S. The public, as well as stakeholders such as FAA unions and 
the financially troubled domestic airline industry, may prefer to advocate maintaining 
the status quo so as to avoid assuming any of the risk or responsibility for delivery of 
this crucial service (Sclar 2003). The tradeoff could be a certain degree of inefficiency 
compared to other ATC providers, notably in the area of personnel management and 
capital investment. The FAA did announce a major reorganization in late 2003, which 
seeks to better focus ATC services within a single division of the agency. The impact 
of this restructuring, as well as the degree to which the announced changes incorporate 




This article provides a comparative analysis of the institutional forms and arrangements 
that have been chosen by six nations for the delivery of air traffic control. As with the 
airline industry, ATC providers are very vulnerable to the financial impact of a decline 
in traffic. Unlike the airlines, ATC providers do not have the option of shutting down 
significant parts of their operations or degrading service when revenues drop. 
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In the post-2001 economic environment, allegations of understaffing by the Swiss 
ATC provider Skyguide following a midair collision, and an increase in near misses in 
UK airspace due to alleged understaffing and low morale in NATS, further support the 
view that ATC is an essential part of a nation’s infrastructure that must be maintained 
regardless of the adequacy of revenues (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment 2003; 
Thomas 2002; Nordwall 2001; Shaoul 2003). The limited ability of ATC providers to 
reduce fixed costs, and many variable costs such as unionized personnel, in times of 
traffic decline is a source of concern. However, operation of ATC by a government or 
other not-for-profit entity does not necessarily translate into inefficiency. 
In this article, we have not attempted to evaluate the different institutional 
arrangements for ATC from the perspective of performance. We have undertaken 
additional research to accomplish this task. In this regard, a significant factor to be 
considered is the impact of the type of mechanisms for increased stakeholder 
involvement on the performance of the ATC provider. The performance of ATC is not 
easy to evaluate, for a number of reasons. Safety is a paramount issue and can be 
measured using a range of criteria, including incidents (crashes, near misses, etc.) per 
thousand flights. Safety also is difficult to evaluate on a comparative basis because of 
factors such as traffic density, type of aircraft, weather, terrain, number and type of 
airfields, instrumentation, and relationships with and impacts of adjoining airspace. 
The economic performance of the ATC provider also is a significant issue. Should 
ATC be organized to make a profit, or simply cover its costs? Given primary concern 
for safety, what degree of congestion and delay is acceptable from an economic 
perspective? Other issues that must be considered include: (a) What is a sufficient level 
of capital investment in ATC? (b) Should the provider seek out additional sources of 
revenue, such as consulting or operating contracts with foreign countries? (c) What is 
the financial relationship (including cost recovery in either direction) with the military? 
(d) If a provider’s board exists, should its members be motivated by some type of an 
incentive structure, and if so, what is it? (e) What social objectives, some requiring 
additional expenditures or foregoing of revenue, are inherent to the provision of ATC? 
(f) To what extent should the government subsidize ATC provision to promote the 
airline industry, tourism, and economic development? (g) Alternatively, should the 
provider depend primarily on user charges, augmented by capital investment from the 
market? (h) How should user charges be allocated among the different user classes? 
All of the above questions are important, and the separation of ATC providers from 
the line departments of governments has made them even more so. Certainly, any 
contemplated reforms to the governance of ATC in the U.S. will have to consider these 
issues. As the experiences of the six nations reviewed in this article demonstrate, the 
determination of the appropriate institutional arrangement for ATC is not a 
straightforward task. Each country has chosen its own path to government reform, 
incorporating concepts of NPM in a unique manner. 
In contrast, aviation has become a truly global industry, and one where consistency 
in safety and efficient service delivery are expected. How each nation undertakes to 
deliver ATC, and the comparative analysis of these efforts, is indeed a fruitful area for 
further research. The U.S. now has a broad range of models to choose from in 
evaluating the options for a fundamental restructuring of ATC, as well as a wealth of 
lessons learned. However, the political decision-making process in the U.S., the size of 
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its aviation system, as well as unique security concerns, will also be key factors 
affecting the likelihood of any significant restructuring. 
In addition to providing a better understanding of ATC service provision across a 
selected number of nations, the purpose of this article has been to assess alternatives for 
reform of ATC in the U.S.  Based on our analysis of alternative institutional 
arrangements for the supply of ATC, we recommend that U.S. policymakers seriously 
consider reforming the U.S. system using the Canadian approach as a model to guide 





1. According to the Airways Corporation of New Zealand, EVA measures the extent to 
which a business is performing above or below expectation. Therefore, a positive EVA 
means the business is adding value after allowing for a market return to the providers of the 
capital. The Airways Corporation of New Zealand calculates EVA as the difference 
between the net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) and the cost of the capital employed to 
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